The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis was not just a term in the history books. The crisis was a collective bitter experience that shook the economic and political foundations of Indonesia. The rupiah exchange rate fell freely, prices soared, riots broke out in various places, and in the end the New Order fell with the fall of President Suharto after 32 years in power.
In the midst of the crisis, George Soros' name became a byword. People who i did not understand deeply the mechanism of the foreign exchange market and heard the news that the rupiah was destroyed because it was played by Soros. Slowly a personification was formed: as ifthe collapse of the Asian currency and financial chaos were the work of one person.
Soros is already known as a world-class financial speculator. Previously, he was famous for betting against the British pound sterling. When the Asian crisis broke out, it was also called-s bet against the Thai baht and was associated with a domino effect that then spread to Southeast Asian countries. Although his direct involvement in the destruction of the rupiah has never been legally proven, the perception that Soros is one of the main figures behind the crisis is already firmly entrenched.
SOROS AND THE 1997-1998 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Perceptions of Soros' role are getting stronger because news during times of crisis is much use terms such as foreign speculators' attacks on Asian currencies. Although not always mentioning one name directly, Soros later became a representation of global market forces that are considered capable of shaking the economy of developing countries.
This view is not only developed in Indonesia. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has publicly blamed Soros for the deterioration of Asian economic conditions. in his public remarks, Mahathir even used harsh words against Soros and made antisemitic accusations about the existence of an elite group that was considered to damage the economy of Muslim countries. The accusation shocked the world, but also received a response from some people who were angry and needed a figure to blame.
Soros denied the accusation and assessed that Mahathir was looking for excuses for his and its own economic policy. Years later, in 2006, Mahathir changed his stance and admitted that Soros was not the cause of the 1997-1998 crisis. The relationship between the two even improved after previously getting into a violent dispute.
Although this recognition appeared later, Soros' stamp as a figure who destroyed the Asian economy was already embedded in public memory. In Indonesia, the bitter experience of 1998 made Soros' name roleh means much more than just an investor or speculator. He began to be seen as a symbol of global financial power that could strike the rupiah again at any time.
Every time the rupiah weakens sharply or the stock market falls, an old question can reappear: lest this be Soros' game again. For some market participants and people who directly experienced the 1998 crisis, the name Soros became sema cam the specter of an economy reminiscent of a time when national stability collapsed simultaneously.
FROM THE GHOST OF THE 1998 CRISIS TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES
The shadowof Soros then did not stop at the 1997-1998 crisis. As new political and social turmoil unfolded, some conspiracy theorists reconnected it with Soros' operation, albeit without clear evidence. Riots, political tensions, and post-election situations can be read through glass old eyes: when things go awry, Soros reappears as a possible actor behind the scenes.
The narrative is also used to explain various events after 1998, including social and political turmoil in the next period until the 2020 pandemic. The old accusation seems to be a pattern that can be reused whenever Indonesia experiences instability. Soros is portrayed as a ghost who reappears faithfully p times the national situation enters a crisis period.
In political discourse, the name Soros can also be used to delegitimize opposition movements. When there were large demonstrations that were considered threatening the government, insinuations emerged that the movement must have been funded by Soros. The logic is simple: if Soros is believed to have played a role in bringing down Suharto in 1998, then any attempt to destabilize the government afterwards is also easily linked to oh the same.
This perspective is simple, but at the same time simplifies a much more complex problem. The 1997-1998 crisis itself involved many factors, both domestic and global, ranging from private debt, property bubbles, financial sector conditions, monetary policy, to loss of market confidence. A crisis of that magnitude cannot be explained by the actions of just one individual.
Soros himself denies ever doing it n speculation specifically aimed at destroying the rupiah. A number of economists also argue that there is no evidence that a single individual can be the sole cause of such a large crisis. Soros has even criticized the IMF's policies and austerity policies, which he says have exacerbated the impact of the Asian crisis.
However, in the politics of perception, complex explanations are often less powerful than narratives about a single figure who is considered se as the main cause. The figure of the 'bad guy' is easier to understand than the interconnected set of economic factors. Because of this, the name Soros lives on in collective memory as a symbol of external economic threats.
WHEN OLD NARRATIVES ARE REUSED
In various polemics regarding Soros' role in Indonesia, the story of the 1998 crisis was again raised to build a narrative that Soros had destroyed Indonesia and might be able to t does the same thing again. Old accusations gain new life through social media and various channels of information that have certain political tendencies.
For some, Soros and 1998 seem to be two sides of one coin. Mentioning Soros' name is immediately reminiscent of the collapse of the rupiah, riots, and the fall of Suharto. Conversely, any talk of the 1998 crisis could again bring Soros' name to the forefront. to a major crisis eventually turned into part of a political construction that continues to be inherited.
The narrative has political utility because it can be used to provide simple explanations of complex issues. When governments or ruling groups face pressure, pointing to foreign actors can help distract from domestic demands and frame a movement as an outside threat. L political cloud can be described not as a group that has its own demands, but rather as a party that may work for foreign interests.
On the other hand, the strength of the narrative is also related to the fact that Soros has indeed been involved in global financial activities and has an international philanthropic network. This fact makes his name relatively easy to include in various stories about foreign interference. The question is when such tangible relationships are then used to draw much broader conclusions without evidence of direct involvement in any crisis or political turmoil.
In the end, the legend about Soros and 1998 survives not solely because of economic problems, but because of the strength of people's memories of a time when Indonesia's economy, politics, and security collapsed simultaneously. Kr isis leaves a trauma that makes it easy for people to recognize thesymbols associated with that time.
Therefore, whenever an economic crisis or political turmoil resurfaces, the shadowsof 1998 can appear with Soros' name. This is where it is important to distinguish between historical facts, public perceptions, and conspiracy theories. The 1997-1998 crisis had many causes and could not simply be simplified into is a story about one character. However, as a political narrative, the legend of Soros still has the power to shape the way society understands crises, foreign threats, and political opponents.
Continued......